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39a b s t r a c t
The trust is always present implicitly in the protocols based on cooperation, in particular, between the
entities involved in routing operations in Ad hoc networks. Indeed, as the wireless range of such nodes
is limited, the nodes mutually cooperate with their neighbors in order to extend the remote nodes and
the entire network. In our work, we are interested by trust as security solution for OLSR protocol. This
approach ﬁts particularly with characteristics of ad hoc networks. Moreover, the explicit trust manage-
ment allows entities to reason with and about trust, and to take decisions regarding other entities.
In this paper, we detail the techniques and the contributions in trust-based security in OLSR. We pres-
ent trust-based analysis of the OLSR protocol using trust speciﬁcation language, and we show how trust-
based reasoning can allow each node to evaluate the behavior of the other nodes. After the detection of
misbehaving nodes, we propose solutions of prevention and countermeasures to resolve the situations of
inconsistency, and counter the malicious nodes. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our solution taking
different simulated attacks scenarios. Our approach brings few modiﬁcations and is still compatible with
the bare OLSR.






















Today, mobile Ad-hoc networks (MANETs) are a major element
of the business environment, allowing wireless devices such as cell
phones, laptops, and PDAs to provide mobility to users and enable
them to keep in constant contact with others. Technically, MANETs
are self-organized wireless mobile networks that do not rely on
any centralized administration or ﬁxed network infrastructure.
The cooperation between the mobile devices allows to provide
the network services. More precisely, each device participates in
routing service: a communication between distant devices can be
established only if intermediate devices cooperate by forwarding
the messages they receive. Thus, each device of a MANET has to
maintain a local routing table that determines the next hop toward
all other devices. The routing table is managed using an ad hoc
routing protocol (for example: OLSR, AODV).
Many ad hoc routing protocols have been developed for ad hoc
networks [1]. Roughly speaking, they can be classiﬁed according to
the type of route discovery: reactive and proactive. In reactive pro-
tocols, e.g. AODV (Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector), the routing
request is sent on-demand: if a device wants to communicate with
another, then it broadcasts a route request and expects a response85
86
87
88from the destination. Conversely, proactive protocols update their
routing information continuously in order to have a permanent
overview of the network topology (e.g. OLSR [2]).
The security of MANET is a major challenge, and the self organi-
zation characteristics of MANET imply that traditional security
solutions are often inadequate. In other words, any device partici-
pating to the routing service can easily attack the MANET either by
disrupting any communication with which it is involved, or by
compromising the routing tables of other devices. It is important
to point out that these two attacks affect the network at two differ-
ent levels: the ﬁrst one is the message routing, whereas the second
is the ad hoc routing protocol.
As regards the security of the message routing, the classical
approach consists in using reputation systems to detect mis-
behavioral devices (e.g. devices that do not forward the messages).
Concerning the security of the ad hoc routing protocol, most
research assumes that as long as the messages containing the topo-
logical information are secured, the routing tables cannot be com-
promised. Our point of view is that such an approach is not
sufﬁcient since in any ad hoc routing protocol, a device can easily
compromise the routing tables by sending incorrect topological
information in secured messages. Thus, solutions that guarantee
the correctness of the routing tables have to be proposed.
Assuming that any protocol is based on implicit trust relations
(as demonstrated in [3] and Section 4), we assert that such trust
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Q1behavior of the other devices, and also to reason about the correct-
ness of its routing table. In this article, we illustrate this through
the OLSR (Optimized Link State Routing protocol [2]) protocol.
We summarize our contributions to the analysis of the implicit
trust within OLSR, and to the trust-based reasoning and counter-
measures for securing OLSR nodes.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, related works on
security in ad hoc networks are summarized. In Section 3, we
introduce the concept of trust management and trust speciﬁcation
language. An overview of OLSR is presented in Section 4. In Section
5, we introduce the analysis of implicit trust in OLSR, then we
present trust reasoning developed to secure OLSR in Section 6.
Countermeasures concerning the attacks against the basic opera-
tions in OLSR, and a method of distribution of information about
trust relation to prove the attack and prevent distant nodes in
the network are detailed in Section 7. Finally, we conclude this

















































As we pointed out before, the routing service in MANET can be
attacked either by disrupting the message routing or by compro-
mising the routing tables. In the former case, the main concern is
to protect against misbehaving devices, and especially selﬁsh
devices (i.e. devices that do not properly forward messages). The
traditional solution consists in forcing the devices to collaborate.
One of the early works on collaboration is presented by Marti et
al. [4]. The authors introduce the watchdog and pathrater mecha-
nisms. Basically, the watchdog mechanism is used by each node to
monitor the behavior of its neighbors. Using the information of the
watchdog, the device can locally compute a rating for each of its
neighbor, and when this rating is below a given threshold, it uses
the pathratermechanism to compute another path avoiding misbe-
having devices. Thus, selﬁsh devices are detected and not used
anymore. Note that Marti et al. do not allow each device to notify
other devices when a malicious device is detected.
Today, a major part of the research works on collaboration in
MANET has been inspired by this previous work, especially by
using the watchdog mechanism to build a reputation system
[5,6,8–10]. For example, in [6], the authors propose a collaboration
system called CONFIDANT (Cooperation Of Nodes: Fairness In
Dynamic Ad-hoc NeTworks) based on a reputation system. More
speciﬁcally, each device uses a watchdog mechanism to monitor
and report the message routing behavior of other devices. Given
the observed and reported behavior, each device computes a repu-
tation score for each device to detect misbehaving ones. The detec-
tion of misbehaving devices leads to their isolation. Thus, the
devices are constrained to cooperate so as not to be isolated. Later,
the same authors extended their cooperation system in order to
deal with devices that deliberately send false reputation scores
[11].
Similarly, Michiardi et al. propose a cooperation enforcement
mechanism, called CORE (COllaborative REputation) [7]. Basically,
CORE uses a watchdog mechanism to allow each device to monitor
its neighbors. Based on its own observation as well as the scores
provided by other devices involved in the current operation, a de-
vice can compute a reputation score for each of its neighbor, this
score represents the degree of cooperation. Then, when a selﬁsh
device is detected, it is gradually denied network services. Thus,
a device cooperates, otherwise it can no longer use the MANET.
Notice that CORE allows to rehabilitate selﬁsh devices if they be-
have correctly again.
In contrast, Buttyan and Hubaux have proposed the collabora-
tion mechanism, called Nuglets [12] adopting a completely differ-
ent approach. They introduce a virtual currency called nuglet. EachPlease cite this article in press as: A. Adnane et al., Trust-based security for the O
j.comcom.2013.04.003node has to pay to use network services (forwarding its data), and
must be paid for offering services to other nodes. Thus, selﬁsh
nodes will ﬁnish their nuglets and can no longer send packets.
The drawback of this method is that the nuglets are managed by
a centralized entity.
In brief, collaboration systems are based either on reputation
systems monitoring the neighbors’ behavior to detect misbehaving
devices (e.g. selﬁsh nodes), or on a virtual currency to enforce the
nodes to collaborate. However, in both cases, the solutions implic-
itly assume that the routing tables are correct.
However, other works propose reputation systems that can also
be applied for securing routing protocol by monitoring node
behavior, in order to verify that nodes respect the routing protocol
speciﬁcation. For example, CORE [7] is suggested as a generic
mechanism and can be integrated with any network service. Pre-
cisely, Meka et al. [10] propose trust-based reputation model for
AODV. Reputation is calculated according to the degree of partici-
pation in the routing protocol and the information it provides
about the network topology. Reputation system was also used as
a security method to perform trust-based multi-path routing
[13,14]. Thus, they do not allow to detect a malicious node which
would be a normal behavior in terms of message routing, but a
misbehavior with respect to the ad hoc routing protocol.
To deal with compromised routing tables, the major part of the
research works is based on cryptography to secure the messages
containing the topology information used to calculate the routing
tables. The underlying assumption is that authenticated devices
are known to behave correctly: when some topology information
is authenticated, it is correct/trusted. In other words, the main con-
cern of these research works is to keep unknown devices (i.e.
intruders) out of the MANET, thus stopping such devices from
modifying/falsifying topology information sent by authenticated
devices.
Many research works have proposed security solutions for reac-
tive ad hoc routing protocol based on cryptography [15–17]. For
example, Zapata and Asokan [16] have proposed a secured version
of AODV. The authors present two mechanisms to secure the AODV
messages: digital signatures to authenticate the non-mutable
ﬁelds of the messages, and hash chains to secure the hop count
information (the only mutable information in the messages). Ari-
adne [17] is another secured protocol based on DSR and TESLA:
the authors assume that a shared secret key is distributed for a
group of trusted nodes using TESLA and that the nodes are
synchronized.
Similarly, some research works have been undertaken for the
security of proactive ad hoc routing protocols based on cryptogra-
phy [19,20]. For example, Adjih et al. [20] have proposed a secured
version of OLSR called SOLSR. Their approach is based on the signa-
ture and time-stamp of each OLSR control message. A signature is
generated for each control message and sent with the message to
prevent malicious nodes to modify or falsify topology information.
In addition, a time-stamp is associated with each signature to esti-
mate the freshness of the message. However, This solution does
not ensure the correctness of the information provided by authen-
ticated nodes, and assumes that any authenticated node is a
trusted node without any veriﬁcation. The solution of Hafslunf et
al. consists in signing the OLSR packets. In our view, this latter ap-
proach is not adapted since a corrupted node can easily modify the
content of a TCmessage before generating the signature of the new
packet which will contain it.
Omar et al. [18] propose a fully distributed public key certiﬁcate
management system based on trust graphs and threshold cryptog-
raphy. It allows nodes to issue public key certiﬁcates, and to
authenticate the other nodes via certiﬁcates chains without trusted
authority. The proposed solution uses the threshold cryptography
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Q1phase is based on Shamir’s secret, the secret key is kept secret at
the system dealer which is a telecommunication service provider
common to all current members. The authors assume that trust
relationships exists between initial nodes. So, to join the network,
the new node have to provide a trust evidence which is authenti-
cated by a member node.
In brief, solutions based on cryptography implicitly assume that
an authenticated node is trustworthy and that the topology infor-
mation it generates is correct. But these solutions do not allow to
prevent a malicious authenticated device to disseminate incorrect
topological information. However, we can note that Raffo et al.
[21] have extended SOLSR to address the problem where authenti-
cated nodes have been compromised by attackers, and can then
inject false (though correctly signed) topology messages. The basic
idea is that each node signs its topology messages, these signatures
being reused later by other devices to prove their own topology
messages. The resulting solution allows to prevent devices to
declare imaginary links. However, it does not allow to verify the
correctness of the routing tables.
Another topic of research concerns intrusion detection. Brieﬂy
speaking, an intrusion detection system (IDS) uses a watchdog
mechanism to monitor some events, and analyzes those events
to ﬁnd malicious devices. This analysis consists in either compar-
ing the current behavior with the correct behavior (i.e. anomaly
detection), or ﬁnding attack scenarios from a signature database
(i.e. misuse detection). In the context of MANETs, most of the solu-
tions propose a generic distributed architecture, each node having
its own local intrusion detection system (LIDS), and global detec-
tion being performed thanks to a module that allows the coopera-
tion between the LIDS [22,23]. The monitored events are generally
the neighbor behaviors, any misbehaviors being an intrusion.
Wang et al. [24] and Cuppens-Boulahia et al. [25] were inter-
ested in securing OLSR protocol by using semantic properties of
the protocol. They propose an intrusion detection system for veri-
fying the correctness of OLSR control messages.
Wang et al. [24] present an intrusion detection approach for
OLSR based on checking protocol semantics (messages consis-
tency). The semantic properties that are implied by the protocol
deﬁnition are used by every MANET node for conﬂict checking
regarding the correct OLSR routing behavior. We show hereafter
that these properties can be expressed in terms of trust, allowing
the formulation of a basic intrusion detection mechanism based
on mistrust. Moreover, the reasoning on trust is shown to be useful
for a node to counter other attacks that circumvent these semantic
properties. However, the authors do not propose countermeasures
to stop and isolate malicious nodes.
Cuppens-Boulahia et al. [25] have precisely sought to deﬁne
such countermeasures against malicious nodes. Based on the same
detection mechanism as that of Wang et al. [24], the authors ana-
lyze the possible attacks against OLSR, and present solutions to
counter attacks by offering legitimate nodes new routes that do
not include malicious nodes. However, detection is again limited
to the local vision and does not check the consistency of all these
observations (for example, they do not check the consistency of
Topology Control (TC) messages and the routing table [2]). On
the other hand, the authors do not verify that the new calculated
routes are consistent with the speciﬁcation of OLSR, and thus they
do not ensure that it will not be detected as an inconsistency.
To our knowledge, only Wang et al. [24] and Cuppens-Boulahia
et al. [25] were interested in semantic properties in OLSR protocol.
Their approach is presented as an intrusion detection system. In
our view, it can be regarded as a trust reasoning because it allows
each node to reason and to verify the consistency of received infor-
mation before trusting the sender. However, their approach is lim-
ited to semantic properties of local observation, and does not
allow sharing local observations.Please cite this article in press as: A. Adnane et al., Trust-based security for the O
j.comcom.2013.04.003In our work, we assume that it is important to deﬁne the correct
behavior in the routing operation to detect attacks against the
OLSR protocol. We ﬁrst analyze the semantics properties of OLSR
in terms of trust [26], and we identify implicit trust-related prop-
erties in OLSR that can be used for malicious purpose. Then we pro-
pose to integrate trust-based reasoning in each OLSR node for the
veriﬁcation of local and global vision of the network [27–29].
Finally, we present two measures to counter attacks against OLSR:
prevention that solves some protocol vulnerabilities, and counter-
measures that deal with misbehavior and inconsistency because
prevention measures cannot solve all the vulnerabilities causing
inconsistency. The proposed prevention measures are based on
message signature proposed by Adjih et al. [20] (that we call
SOLSR). The difference is that we use the provable identity mecha-
nism instead of a trusted centralized authority for public key certi-
ﬁcation. The resulting mechanisms allow to resolve the OLSR
vulnerabilities which are due to the easy usurpation of node
identity and the lack of links veriﬁcation at the neighborhood dis-
covery. However, these mechanisms do not resolve other vulnera-
bilities, such as the lack of monitoring of the establishment of the
routing tables. Thus, when other vulnerabilities are exploited and
an attack is detected, we propose countermeasures to isolate mali-
cious nodes.
To sum up, routing service in MANET is provided by an ad hoc
routing protocol that allows each device to calculate and maintain
its routing tables, and the routing messages using the resulting
routing tables. Cryptographic mechanisms allow to secure the ex-
changes between the devices, and in particular, the topology infor-
mation used to calculate the routing tables, whereas cooperation
and reputation mechanisms can contribute to enforce the devices
to participate in the routing messages. However, none of these
approaches allow to guarantee the correctness of the routing
tables. Thus, we assert that these approaches should be reinforced
by a speciﬁc mechanism that permits each device to verify that its
routing table is correct, i.e. it has a correct vision of the network
topology.
In our contribution, we propose for each device to assess the
behavior of the other devices with respect to the implicit trust rela-
tions induced by the OLSR protocol. Note that since we focus on
malicious devices that disseminate topological information to
compromise the routing tables, we suppose that SOLSR [20] is used
to ensure the security of the OLSR messages. SOLSR ensures only
the security of OLSRmessages, but does not ensures that the source
authenticated node is not giving wrong topology information. Our
work verify that trusted nodes (authenticated nodes) are behaving
correctly, and respecting the OLSR speciﬁcation. Trust is build with
correct behavior, and not created only with authentication.
3. Trust management in ad hoc routing
Trust, trust models and trust management have been the sub-
jects of several ongoing research projects. Trust is recognized as
an important aspect for decision-making in distributed and auto-
organized applications [3].
In the literature, there is no consensus on the deﬁnition of trust
and what trust management encompasses. Many authors propose
their own deﬁnitions of trust, each one concerning a speciﬁc re-
search area such as authentication [31], e-commerce, P2P, and
many other ﬁelds. As a result, a multitude of formal models for
trust calculation and management have emerged. However, this
also leads to a certain conceptual confusion, indicated by the fact
that similar concepts appear under different names and recipro-
cally. To avoid this confusion, in the present paper, we use the trust
deﬁnition and a language to express trust proposed by Yahalom
et al. [31] which together allow to formalize and clarify trust as-
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Q1‘‘The notion of trust is fundamental for understanding the
interactions between devices such as human beings, organiza-
tions, nations and others. The fact that a node A trusts a node B
in some respect, informally, means that A believes that B will
behave in a certain way and will perform some action under cer-
tain speciﬁc circumstances’’.
3.1. Trust classes
Trust relation is established according to the possibility of con-
ducting a protocol operation (action), and is evaluated by the entity
A on the basis of what it knows about the entity B and the circum-
stances of the operation. According to the action undertaken and
its circumstances of execution, it is necessary to distinguish vari-
ous trust classes as deﬁned in [31,32]. For the sake of precision
on the formalization of trust relations required by OLSR, we pro-
pose appropriate classes for the actions performed by this protocol
(i.e, the trust in another entity to route messages: routing trust).
First, we use trust classes deﬁned in [31] in the context of the anal-
ysis of authentication protocols. An entity may trust another one
for one of the following actions:
 Providing identiﬁcation of one entity to another (the class iden-
tiﬁcation: id).
 Not interfering in other entities sessions, neither passively by
reading other secret messages, nor actively by impersonating
one of the parties (class not-interfering: ni).
 Providing trust recommendations about other entities (rec).
Then, we also use the classes proposed in [32], speciﬁcally:
 A trusting entity which grants the access to its resources or ser-
vices by other entities (access trust class: at).
 A truster trusts a trustee to make decisions on its behalf, with
respect to a resource or service that the truster owns or controls
(delegation trust class: dt).
Finally, we deﬁne sub-classes for actions carried out effectively
by OLSR protocol, such as trust for routing (fw).
3.2. Trust speciﬁcation language
We use the language proposed by Yahalom et al. [31] for
expressing the clauses concerning trust in a networking protocol.
The trust relation is taken into account if the possibility of realiza-
tion of a protocol operation (the action) is evaluated by entity A on
the basis of what it knows about entity B and the circumstances of
this operation.
We distinguish the direct trust relations and the derived trust
relations as mentioned in [31], the latter being established on rec-
ommendations from other entities. Given the presence of several
types of entities in the execution environment of a protocol, and
the existence of indirect relationship between the entities, it is nec-
essary to distinguish these two types of trust relations. Thus, the
clauses relating to trust are expressedwith the following notations:
 Each entity is identiﬁed by a single name; the terms A; B; C
indicate speciﬁc entities.
 A speciﬁc trust class is noted cc.
 The formula A trustsccðBÞ means that A trusts B with respect to
the action cc.
 A trustsccðSÞmeans that A trusts the set of entities Swith respect
to action cc, S being deﬁned as the set of all entities for which a
certain predicate holds.Please cite this article in press as: A. Adnane et al., Trust-based security for the O
j.comcom.2013.04.003 A trustsccCðBÞ means that A trusts B to perform action cc with
respect to the entity C (but not necessarily to other entities).
 A trusts:recccðBÞ when:path½S when:target½R means that A trusts
the recommendations of entity B about the capacity of other
entities to perform action cc. The when clauses allow the speci-
ﬁcation of constraints on the recommendations. The trust rec-
ommendation path is a sequence of entities such that each
one is recommended by its predecessor. So, the when.path spec-
iﬁes the only set of entities to be considered as candidates for
the next step in the recommendation path. The target clauses
speciﬁes the only set of entities to be considered as candidates
for becoming target entities in some recommendation paths.
 A trusts:recccCðBÞ presents the derived recommendations
deduced from previous recommendations of B.
 A:trustsðBÞ means that A mistrusts B. In our approach, we con-
sider that mistrust relation is total and does not concern a par-
ticular action. If B is compromised (i.e. it does not respect the
routing protocol), and does not complete requested action, then
A mistrusts it for all other actions. We call this relation exact
mistrust.
 A:trustsðSÞ means that A mistrusts all the nodes included in S.
This mistrust relationship is called partial mistrust, because A
detects an inconsistency in the achievement of the action
requested from the group of nodes S, but is unable to identify
precisely which node. It is important to mention that the nota-
tion A:trustsðfB;CgÞ is not equivalent to A:trustsðBÞ and
A:trustsðCÞ : A:trustsðfB;CgÞ means that A detects an inconsis-
tency between nodes B and C, but is unable to identify precisely
which nodes are malicious. The mistrust relation is related to
the action accomplished by a group of nodes.
In the following sections, the use of this language, together with
the mathematical set theory, allows to reason about the trust
required by the OLSR protocol and to explicitly express trust rela-
tions between the nodes executing this protocol.
4. OLSR protocol: overview and trust-based analysis
OLSR is a proactive link-state routing protocol, which uses an
optimized ﬂooding mechanism to broadcast partial link state infor-
mation to all network nodes. The protocol uses multi-point relays
(MPR) which are selected nodes that forward broadcasted
messages during the ﬂooding process. The link state information
is generated only by nodes elected as MPRs, and each MPR must
only report on the state of links between itself and its selectors.
Two types of control messages, HELLO and TC (Topological Con-
trol), allow each node to obtain and declare network topological
information. HELLO and TC messages have validity time, which
indicates for how long time after reception a node must consider
the information contained in the message as valid, unless a more
recent update to the information is received.
The functioning of OLSR occurs in three steps: neighborhood
discovery, MPR selection, and Routing table calculation. In this sec-
tion, while presenting the OLSR protocol, we analyze the implicit
trust relationships established between OLSR nodes. This analysis
allows the identiﬁcation of trust assumptions built during the dif-
ferent steps of the protocol and how it can be used by attackers.
4.1. Notations
In OLSR, each node maintains its local vision of the network.
This vision consists of the following sets:











































































































Fig. 1. Trust establishment during neighborhood discovery between A and B.
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Q1 LSx: the link set of node x : LSx ¼ fMANET; fasym; symgg. It
includes the set of asymmetric (status = asym) and symmetric
neighbors (status = sym) of node x.
 NSx: the set of symmetric neighbors of node x,
 2HNSx: the set of two-hop neighbors of node x,
 MPRSx: the set of nodes selected as MPRs by node x
(MPRSx#NSx), which are in charge of routing and forwarding
the packets sent by x.
 MSSx (MPR Selection Set): the set of symmetric neighbors which
have selected node x as MPR (MSSx#NSx).
 RTx (Routing Table): the routing table of node x.
 routex!y is the sequence of nodes included in the route (shortest
path) between x and y, which has the form of the following
predicate:
routey1!yn ¼ y1; . . . ; yn; where yiþ1 2 MPRSyi .
 TopologySet: the set of information provided by the received TC
message, which describes the network topology.
Each node collects information about the network by exchang-
ing HELLO and TC messages. These exchanges are presented by the
following formula:
 HELLOx is the HELLO message generated by node x; it includes
the set of the neighbors of x. This message is diffused periodi-
cally and is not broadcasted. In this message, each neighbor is
presented with the following formula: HELLOx ¼ fMANET;
fasym; sym;mprgg Thus, the HELLO message is used to deduce
the sets LSx; NSx and MPRSx. As HELLO messages are diffused
periodically by x; LSx; NSx and MPRSx can be deduced by all
the neighbors of x.
 TCx is the TC message generated by node x and contains the list
of its MPR selectors MSS : TCx ¼ MSSx. In OLSR, TC messages are
diffused periodically, and broadcasted only by the MPR nodes.
 x  HELLOy y; x TCy y: respectively, the reception of HELLO and TC
messages from y by node x.
 x!TCx ; x !DATAx  : x broadcasts its TC and DATA messages. These
messages should be retransmitted by the MPR nodes of x.
 ðTCxÞy: this notation signiﬁes the TC message of x is retransmit-
ted by y.
 x8TCy y; x 8DATAx y: when y is MPR of x, this notation means y does
not retransmit the data/TC messages generated by x after an
awaiting period.
OLSR does not implement this event. In our work, we have de-
ﬁned an event that waits for a speciﬁed period after sending each
TC and DATA messages, the event waits to receive the same mes-
sage from the MPR nodes of x (MPR nodes have to forward mes-
sages of their selectors). If the waiting time elapses, and the
message is not received, the event returns an error.
4.2. Neighborhood discovery
The ﬁrst step in OLSR is neighborhood discovery, it allows each
node to detect one-hop and two-hop neighbors by exchanging
HELLO messages. HELLO messages are sent periodically by a node
to advertise its links (declared as asymmetric, symmetric or MPR)
with neighbor nodes. Received HELLO messages allow a node to
memorize information about links and nodes within its two-hop
neighborhood, and to constitute the internal local state of each
node which is represented under the form of sets, (LS, NS, 2HNS,
MPRS, MSS). These sets are updated and used continuously for
MPR selection, in such way that a message sent by the node and
relayed by its MPR set (i.e. the elements of its MPRS) will be re-
ceived by all its two-hop neighbors. Each node also records the ad-
dresses of its neighbors that selected it as MPR (what constitutesPlease cite this article in press as: A. Adnane et al., Trust-based security for the O
j.comcom.2013.04.003the MSS). Thus, HELLO messages allow a node to establish its view
of the ‘‘small world’’ (up to the two-hop neighborhood).
Given the general description of the protocol and the deﬁnition
of the sets maintained by the OLSR node, the language described in
Section 3.2 may be used to express the trust relationships in this
protocol. In OLSR, the nodes are considered to be cooperative and
to trust the fact of obtaining the cooperation of the neighbor nodes.
This behavior corresponds to the concept of general trust as de-
ﬁned in [3]. For example, the RFC 3626 [2] states that ‘‘a node
should always use the same address as its main address’’ (p. 5),
which is the basic belief of a node in the identity of others. This
statement is translated using the formal language into the follow-
ing formula:
8A;B 2 MANET : AtrustsidðBÞ
Initially, a node A does not have any view of the network (no
neighbors). The node starts building its view with the reception
of HELLO messages coming from the neighbors. These messages al-
low the node to detect asymmetrical links, leading to a modiﬁca-
tion of the local state of A about its trust in a neighbor node B,
i.e. A knows B but does not have opinion about it yet, because A
is not sure that B respects the OLSR speciﬁcation with regard to
the reception and sending of HELLO messages: A  HELLOB B : ðA; symÞ
R LSB orðA; asymÞ R LSB ) LSA  LSA [ðB; asymÞ.
This formula means that A does not have opinion about B,
although A receives HELLO messages from B. However, being an
agent generally trustful [3], A broadcasts HELLO messages that
can be received by B which in turn will be able to take them into
account, and then adds A to its set of symmetrical neighbors NSB
(Fig. 1). If B acts according to the protocol, i.e. it sends HELLO mes-
sages advertising a link with A, then a new situation of trust is
reached:
A  HELLOBB; ðA; link stateÞ 2 LSB; link state 2 fasym; symg
) A trustsid[niðBÞ;
LSA ¼ LSA [ ðB; symÞ;
NSA ¼ NSA [ fBg;
2HNSA ¼ 2HNSA [ ðNSB  fAgÞ ð1Þ
A trust relation has just been built which is concretized by the fact
that now A regards B as its symmetrical neighbor, and the symmet-
rical neighbors of B as 2-hop neighbors. In addition, this trust rela-
tion is seen as symmetrical, since B is expected to behave in the
same way as A:
B  HELLOA) B trustsid[niðAÞ
This symmetrical relation is the basis for future decisions which will
be taken by A about its small world (MPR selection), but also, for the
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Q1through the exchange of TC messages. The following ﬁgure sums up
trust relations during neighborhood discovery Fig. 1:
4.3. MPR selection
MPR selection is the most important operation in OLSR. After
the detection of one-hop and two-hop neighbors, each node must,
among its one-hop neighbors, select the minimum number of
nodes enabling it to reach all the two-hop neighbors. The selected
neighbors are called MPRs, and are advertised in the HELLO
message with ‘‘mpr’’ status.
For example, in Fig. 2, node A (NSA ¼ fB;C; Eg;2HNSA ¼ fD; Fg)
has to select C as MPR, because it provides reachability to F. As D
can also be reachable via C, then C will be the only MPR of A.
When a node is selected as MPR, it adds the selectors in its MSS
and generates a TC message advertising all these nodes as illus-
trated in Fig. 3.
TC messages contain the topological information necessary for
computing routes to the whole network, the ‘‘big world’’. The
reception of TC messages allows a node to obtain information
about destination nodes and to keep this information in its Topo-
logySet. Each node selected as MPR periodically broadcasts TC
messages advertising its MPR selectors neighbors. TC messages
are ﬂooded in the whole network allowing the nodes to compute
the network topology to be used for routing (routing table). In
terms of trust, when a node A selects a node C to be MPR (router),
this means A trusts C (and all the nodes in its MPRS) for routing:
8y 2 MPRSA : A trustsfwðyÞ ð2Þ
The MPR nodes of A also have to select their MPRs and so on.
Consequently, the MPR nodes of A are required to recommend A
the routes to the distant nodes. So, each node trusts the recom-
mendation of its MPRs for routing to any distant nodes:
8z 2 MANET; 9y
2 MPRA A trusts:recfw ðyÞwhen:path½routey!z when:target½z
ð3Þ
This formula presents the general rule of trust recursiveness for
the routing in the networks operating under OLSR. Indeed, the
routing success depends not only on the local MPR selection, but
























Fig. 3. Trust establishment during MPR selection: C is MPR of A.
Please cite this article in press as: A. Adnane et al., Trust-based security for the O
j.comcom.2013.04.003trusts the MPR selection of its MPR and so on. On the reception of
HELLO messages, the MPR node C discovers that it is selected as
MPR by A (link with mpr status) and updates its MSS. This calcula-
tion allows a node C to discover information about the trust that
other nodes place in it.
As C allows the nodes of its MSS to use its resources for routing,
which constitutes a form of access trust as discussed in Section 3,
the calculation of MSSC implies the following trust relations
(Fig. 3):
 C trusts A to use its resources for routing without causing pre-
judice: C trustsatðAÞ
 C trusts A for advertising that C is its MPR: C trustsdt ðAÞ
4.4. Routing table calculation
The routing table is the result of the OLSR protocol. Each node
creates its point of view of the network topology, and calculates
the shortest path to any destination using the Dijkstra shortest
path algorithm. The routing table RT is described by the following
formula: 8z 2 MANET; 9y 2 MPRSx ) 9T 2 RTx; T ¼ ðz; y;N; IÞ. Each
entry in RT consists of (z; y;N; I), and speciﬁes that the node identi-
ﬁed by z is located N hops away from the local node. The symmet-
ric neighbor node which is identiﬁed by y is the next hop node in
the route to z. This symmetric neighbor node is reachable through
the local interface I.
From the trust point of view, the calculation of the shortest path
between x and z through the MPR y means that x trusts y for the
routing towards z. If we note T ¼ ðz; y;N; IÞ, a tuple of RTx, the
following relation is obtained:
8T 2 RTx ) x trustsfwzðyÞ ð4Þ
Moreover, the routing table is calculated in order to have only
one route towards each destination, and each selected route is
the shortest among the routes starting fromMPR nodes. The inher-
ent risk in the choice of only one route towards any destination is
to choose a misbehaving node as a router. In [26], we explain how
this vulnerability can be exploited by attackers, who give false
information about the network topology in order to redirect all
the trafﬁc of the network towards them and/or to disturb protocol
operation.
Even if there are several paths towards z; x will only choose the
shortest route starting from one of its MPRs. The routing table cal-
culation is a reasoning based on the distance and results in the set
of routes which the node considers as the most adequate for the
routing. After computing the distances to each destination, the
node will place more trust on the nodes which offer the shortest
path (formula 4).
The selection of y as MPR by x for routing towards a node z im-
plies that x not only trusts y for routing (formula 2), but also trusts
the choices of the routes made by y (formula 3). Actually, there is a
chain of this indirect trust relation between x and any relay for-
warding the packets to z. This chain has the particularity that only
the last relay before z exchanges control messages directly with z
(HELLO messages). This sequence expresses the recursiveness of
MPR recommendations in OLSR, a property which allows us to de-
duce the following relation [26]:
x trusts:recfwz ðzÞ when:target½z when:path½z ð5Þ
This formula means that the routing target node is itself the
starting point of the trust chain, and its MPR should be properly
chosen so that all other nodes can correctly communicate with this
node. This leads to a spreading of the trust placed in the MPRs.
Certain attacks against OLSR exploit the vulnerability resulting
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Q1should have a degree of mistrust concerning the information used
for the calculation of the routing table. This mistrust could be asso-
ciated to the validating procedure of the routing information which
is spread in the network (TC messages).
5. Trust reasoning for securing OLSR protocol
In this section, we investigate how a node can detect misbehav-
ing nodes by reasoning about information received from the net-
work. Anomaly detection includes the consistency veriﬁcation in
OLSR messages (TC and HELLO) and trust-based reasoning that
can be performed by each node in the network. Although it is a
continuous process, the detection must progress from the recep-
tion of the link discovery messages to the construction of the
routing table, giving the particular evolution of trust among nodes
during these operations. In other words, a recursive and continu-
ous checking of trust properties must be carried out, in order to
validate all information received from the network, even after this
node establishes a trust relation.
5.1. Validation of neighborhood discovery
The basic trust within OLSR is expressed by the fact that,
according to the protocol speciﬁcation [2], an OLSR node believes
that a neighbor presents a correct identiﬁcation (ID) and is com-
mitted to not interfering (NI) in the right protocol execution.
Therefore, as pointed out by Wang et al. [24], this leads to intrin-
sic properties of the protocol regarding the expected correct
behavior in message processing and routing organization. Con-
cretely, a node x can believe that a neighbor y is generating cor-
rect messages on conformity to the OLSR speciﬁcation if, by
correlating messages coming from y, node x is able to verify the
following properties:
1. MPR selectors of a node y (MSSy) advertised in TCy are symmet-
ric neighbors of y.
2. When a node y advertises x in its TC message, being MPR of x, it
has to be declared as MPR neighbor in HELLOx.
3. When TC or DATA messages of a node y are forwarded, the for-
warded message must be identical to the message generated by
y.
The possibilities for an attacker to abuse these properties con-
stitute the basic vulnerabilities of the protocol. However, using
the concept of trust, we are able to reformulate these properties
to express a mistrust reasoning that could be used by a node for
self-protection against misbehaving neighbors. This leads us to a
basic trust-based anomaly detection mechanism:
1. If y advertises it is MPR of other nodes, and it has not advertised
them as symmetric neighbors on its HELLO message, then its
behavior does not correspond to the OLSR speciﬁcation. The









7952. If x detects that a distant node y advertising x on its TC message,
but that it is not selected as MPR, then x must mistrust it,
because its behavior does not correspond to the OLSR
speciﬁcation:796
x TCy ; x 2 TCy; y R MPRSx ) x:trustsðyÞ ð7Þ797
798
7993. If x receives two TC messages from two different nodes with the
same sequence number and originator address but with differ-
ent information, then x must mistrust the two sender nodes:cite this article in press as: A. Adnane et al., Trust-based security for the OLSR rou
om.2013.04.0038z;w 2 MANET; x  ðTCyÞz ; x  ðTCyÞw ; ðTCyÞz –
ðTCyÞw ) x:trustsðfz;wgÞ ð8ÞIndeed, even if a sender is the origin of the message TCy, it may have
an accomplice that sends another TC message to other nodes and
which is different from the one that y sent to x. However, This rule
can not be veriﬁed by nodes which receive only one TC message
from the network. Especially nodes having the misbehaving node
as the only neighbor, they will trust only the messages coming from
it, and will have a wrong view of the network topology.
Note that the mistrust reasoning cannot every time allow the
precise identiﬁcation of the misbehaving node, but allows the
detection of a behavior anomaly related to a group of nodes which
includes the attacker, as indicated in formula 8. Also, it is impor-
tant to mention that it is possible to receive consistent HELLO
and TC messages from an attacker advertising wrong information.
This situation can be detected when the node compares and corre-
lates messages received from different nodes (see next section).
These properties can also be extended to allow nodes to check
the local vision of their neighbors about the network. For example,
if x detects a remote node y advertising one of its neighbors z in the
message TCy, but if z did not declare y as symmetric neighbor, then
it must mistrust y because its behavior does not correspond to the
OLSR speciﬁcation.
Similarly, the neighborhood discovery (links) must be consis-
tent among all nodes. One of the problems that can occur in this
operation is the reception of contradictory HELLO messages from
different neighbors. This may be a temporary situation where a
group of nodes is at the beginning of a discovery process. However,
if the situation arises after an initialization process, the node which
continues to receive contradictory messages should mistrust the
nodes which generate these messages. The neighborhood discov-
ery can be validated by checking links advertised in received HEL-
LO messages. Given the fact that if a symmetric link between two
nodes is advertised by one node, it must also be advertised as such
by the other. In terms of trust, this means a node cannot be sure of
the existence of links between its neighbors if it receives conﬂict-
ing information on this link.
Thus, it is possible to establish basic controls for the detection of
neighbors with abnormal behavior that can increase the robust-
ness of the protocol and allow the detection of possible direct at-
tacks. At this stage, these checks are not enough to counter other
attacks and do not allow a global cooperation for the detection of
abnormal behavior.5.2. Validation of MPR selection
MPR selection is a critical operation, it provides the access to
the network routing infra-structure for each node and allows them
to be known by other distant nodes. In the speciﬁcation of OLSR
[2], there is no veriﬁcation of MPR behavior. This vulnerability is
exploited by many attacks through which the attacker aims to be
selected as MPR by a target node in order to control the target node
input–output message ﬂows [33].
The danger with MPR selection based on the degree of reach-
ability comes from the fact that any attacker can give wrong infor-
mation about its neighbors which cannot be veriﬁed. Thus, to
strengthen the MPR selection, we introduce trust-based reasoning
to counter attacks. In our approach, after the MPR selection each
node should verify the two following points:
1. The correct behavior of an MPR (as speciﬁed by OLSR).
2. The local choices of MPRs by a node must be in accordance to
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Q1We propose for each node to use the concept of trust to super-
vise the behavior of its selected MPR. According to the OLSR
speciﬁcation, the correct behavior of an MPR, regarding routing,
is deﬁned by two operations: TC message generation and Forward-
ing DATA packets and TC messages of the MPR selectors. If a node
is able to validate these functions by observing the MPR behavior,
then the node can consider its trust relation with this MPR correct,
as expressed in (2).
Conversely, if these functions cannot be validated for a selected
MPR node, the trust relation is broken and the selection of this
node as MPR must be canceled:
Checking TC message generation:
If a selected MPR (y) does not generate TC messages correctly
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923Checking data packet and TC message forwarding:
If a selected MPR (y) does not forward data packets (DATAx) and
TC messages (TCx) sent by its MPR selectors, each selector (x)
must mistrust this MPR:
y 2 MPRSx; ðx!TCx ; x 8
ðTCxÞy
yÞorðx !DATAx ; x 8ðDATAxÞy yÞ
) x:trustsðyÞ ð10Þ
This validation can be used to detect the attacks aimed at falsely
modifying the topology by means of TC message fabrication or
modiﬁcation. Also, this can be used against the black-hole attack,
where an attacker MPR drops data messages instead of forwarding
them.
Following the MPR selection, the nodes inMPRSx are required to
recommend x the routes to the distant nodes z (presented in for-
mula 3). The formula presents the general rule of derived trust
for the routing in the networks operating under OLSR. Indirectly,
the nodes establish a trust relation with a distant node (n hops
away, more than 2 hops) by chained recommendations.
In order to allow neighbor behavior veriﬁcation by each node,
we have to check if these neighbors are correctly performing their
MPR selection and routing table calculation. Moreover, each node
has to verify the consistency of advertised information with its lo-
cal network vision.
According to the MPR selection algorithm speciﬁed in OLSR [2],
if two neighbors, x and y, have the same neighbors (NS), they
should also select the same MPRs (except in the situation where
the different MPRs have the same neighbors). This property allows
x and y (and actually any common neighbors of x and y – NSx \ NSy)
to compare MPR selection between x and y. This comparison is
related to an interesting situation which generally arises during
the attacks against MPR selection. In this situation, an attacker A
wants to control the trafﬁc of a target x and so as to be selected
as the only MPR, the attacker advertises all two-hop neighbors of
the target adding a ﬁctitious node as its own direct neighbors
(NSA ¼ NSx [ 2HNSA [ z). Generally, when an attacker A wants to
control the network trafﬁc ﬂowing from a target x to another node
B, this attacker will advertise as neighbors those MPRs selected by
the target to reach node B. This situation is expressed as follows:
x 2 NSy; y 2 NSx; NSx  fyg#NSy  fxg
) MPRSx  fyg#MPRSy  fxg or 8z 2 MPRSx;
9w 2 MPRSy : z – w; NSz ¼ NSw ð11Þ
Reachability is another criterion for MPR selection: the algorithm
speciﬁes each node must begin by selecting as MPR the neighborscite this article in press as: A. Adnane et al., Trust-based security for the O
om.2013.04.003which are the only nodes to provide reachability to certain nodes
in the two-hop neighbor set. Since the symmetric links of neighbors
are not veriﬁed, a malicious node can advertise an additional
unused address (z) with symmetric link status. Hence, on the recep-
tion of a malicious node’s HELLO message, all its neighbors will
choose it as MPR without any existing proof of that link. It is difﬁ-
cult to verify the links status of all the neighbors. Nevertheless,
given the important role of MPR nodes as routers in the network,
this veriﬁcation is essential. In OLSR, we can say that trust level is
more important on the MPR nodes than on the other neighbors
[26], thus the MPRs present a higher risk if they are compromised.
Consequently, this reinforces the need to continuously check the
information provided by the MPR nodes.
There are other properties that can be checked on the reception
of TC messages from a neighbor. These properties allow a node to
validate its own MPR selection and to verify the MPR selection
made by its neighbors:
 Two nodes x and ywith the same neighborhood (the same sym-
metric neighbors) cannot be both selected as MPRs by common
neighbors. Because, if one is selected, for example x, it will pro-
vide reachability to its neighborhood (NSx) which covers y’s
neighborhood (NSy).
 If the neighborhood of a node x includes in the neighborhood of
another node y : NSy  NSx, then y should not be selected as
MPR, all its neighbors must select x as MPR (or another neighbor
with larger neighborhood).
Consequently, when a node x detects an inconsistency related
to the above properties, it has to mistrust the nodes that generate
this information:
x  HELLOAA; x  HELLOBB; 9z 2 MSSA \MSSB; NSA#NSB
) x:trustsðfA;B; zgÞ ð12Þ
Note that x has to mistrust A; B and z. x cannot precisely detect
the misbehaving node, because z may not select its MPRs correctly
in order to use both nodes A and B as router, or it may be that A or B
claim to be MPR of z though they are not.
Once again, it is worth pointing out that the mistrust reasoning
does not always allow the precise identiﬁcation of the misbehaving
node. However, it allows the detection a behavior anomaly related
to a group of nodes which includes the attacker.
5.3. Synthesis
Correlation between received messages allows the OLSR nodes
to validate their local vision and that of their neighbors. When
the received information is coherent with OLSR speciﬁcation, this
reasoning enables the creation and validation of trust relations.
Otherwise, this reasoning allows to mistrust the sources of these
inconsistencies (malicious nodes).
In our previous works, we assumed that the identity of each
node cannot be usurped, yet in OLSR, the identity is equivalent to
the IP address and can be easily spoofed. To resolve this problem
and ensure the assumption, we propose a solution to prevent iden-
tity usurpation, based on provable identity.
This reasoning only represents detection steps, and some nodes
are not able to detect the source of the inconsistency. In addition,
no measures are taken to solve the case of an inconsistency and
counter attack. It is therefore important to investigate possible
countermeasures that a node can apply to solve the problems de-
tected. Nevertheless, the prevention based on provable identity is
not enough to resolve all inconsistencies. For this, we offer other
general countermeasures to isolate the attacker if the attack suc-
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Q16. Provable identity for neighborhood validation
In OLSR, identity usurpation is easy to perform, and it is difﬁcult
to verify the correctness and the existence of the advertised links.
In SOLSR [20], the authors assume that nodes are either trusted or
mistrusted, and that trusted nodes are not compromised. Their
approach is based on the signature and time-stamp of each OLSR
control message (SOLSR is presented in Related works section).
The signature is sent in the same packet with the associated
message.
Each trusted node in the network would be able to acquire the
keys required for the veriﬁcation of signatures of any other node.
To do this, the authors propose two different Public Key Infrastruc-
tures (PKI): proactive and reactive. Both proposals use a certiﬁca-
tion authority that allows to deﬁne trusted nodes and distribute
their public keys. In the case of using a public-key system, the
problem is thus the key distribution/certiﬁcation in a way such
that the public keys can be trusted. In our view, the principle of
ad hoc networks is not compatible with using certiﬁcation author-
ity. Therefore, we propose to use provable identity mechanism





























Fig. 4. Packet format in SOLSR.6.1. Provable identity for OLSR with IPv4
A provable identity is an identity which is easy to verify, but dif-
ﬁcult to usurp. It is not based on a certiﬁcation authority to prove
the identity of each node. The objective is not to authenticate the
other nodes, but once the identity of each node is detected, it en-
sures that the following messages, provided by the same entity,
will be authenticated, and that this identity cannot be usurped
by another node [34,35].
Usually, the public key is used as a provable identity: a node
being identiﬁed with its public key can sign a challenge using its
private key, and it is the only node able to decrypt a message en-
crypted with that public key. Provable identity is an authentication
mechanism adapted to the decentralized nature of ad hoc net-
works, because it is based on asymmetric cryptography and does
not involve a certiﬁcation authority. It allows each node in the ad
hoc network to be identiﬁed and authenticated by other entities
of the network.
OLSR protocol use the IP address to identify nodes and assumes
that each node uses a unique address. However, the IP address does
not guarantee the identity of each node as it can be easily spoofed,
hence the need for a link with the identity encryption (public and
private key). In IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force), some works
have suggested to integrate the mechanism of provable identity in
IPv6, in order to bind the interface identiﬁer with the public key of
the node. In short, the solution consists in applying a hash function
on a public key to obtain its IP address and, at the same time, its
provable identity. Therefore, if OLSR is applied above IPv6, then
provable identity can be obtained simply by integrating the exten-
sion proposed by the IETF [36]. Otherwise (from OLSR on IPv4), we
present in the following paragraph an approach to have a provable
identity for OLSR on IPv4, and this without changing the OLSR mes-
sage structure and routing table. The provable identity mechanism
ensures that an IP address is unique and cannot be misused. Our
approach is based on message signature (SOLSR). We require that
the message signature and the corresponding public key are at-
tached to the same packet. The signature and public key of the
node are added to the OLSR packet as a particular type of message
(Fig. 4).
When exchanges begin, each node A sends its public key KPubA to
other entities that will store the hash of this public key as the prov-
able identity IdPA of A. Before sending packets, each node A signs its
messages using its private key KPriA , and when these messages arePlease cite this article in press as: A. Adnane et al., Trust-based security for the O
j.comcom.2013.04.003received, it is possible to verify their integrity and authenticity by
checking their signatures with the public key of the sender. After
the veriﬁcation of message integrity, the provable identity of the
sender will take the following format (H: Hash function):
IdPA ¼ ðHðKPubA ÞÞ,
Consequently, if two nodes use the same IP address, they are
considered as two different identities because they do not have
the same public key. So, they have to change their IP address to
be accepted into the network. To avoid this situation and ensure
that an IP address is used only by one node, we propose the use
of a table TabIP index on IP addresses which associates each public
key to one IP address: KPubA ¼ TabIPð@IPAÞ (see Table 1).
Therefore, if a node x with the public key KPubx has the same IP
address as another node A, the TabIPn table returns the public key
of A (TabIPð@IPAÞ ¼ KPubA ) which was previously saved and which is
different from the public key of x (KPubx – KPubA ). Then messages of
x will be rejected by n and x has to change its IP address to inte-
grate the network. If a node detects that another node uses the
same IP address, then it has to change it.
On the other hand, if a node changes its IP address without
changing the public key, it will be detected as another entity, be-
cause no public key has been registered for the new IP address.
This means that veriﬁcation of identity in the table IP address is
not sufﬁcient and it is important to check if its provable identity
(hash of its public key) has already been detected. To do this, we
propose the use of a second table, called hash table TabH (Table
2), which is indexed on the hash of public key. This represents an
optimization because it allows reasoning on the hash and not on
the public key: @IPA ¼ TabHðHðKPubA ÞÞ.
In this case, if a node changes its IP address without changing its
public key, then the new IP address will be updated without chang-
ing the provable identity.
In brief, the veriﬁcations of IP address in TabIPn table and public
key in TabHn table ensure to the node n that one IP address can be
used only by a single node, and if a node changes its IP address
without changing its public key it will be detected having the same
provable identity. The use of the two tables TabHn and TabIPn allows
us to represent the provable identity as the hash of the public key:
KPubA ¼ TabIPnð@IPAÞ and @IPA
¼ TabHnðHðKPubA ÞÞ () IdPA ¼ HðKPubA Þ ð13Þ6.2. Proof of neighborhood
Relying on message signature (the solution proposed by SOLSR)
and provable identity, we propose a preventive method to secure
the neighborhood discovery. This method ensures the integrity of
the information provided by symmetric neighbors, and thus vali-
dates the neighbor discovery (one-hop and two-hop neighbors)
and MPR selection.
In the following, we will reconsider the previous formulas with
the provable identity notation, for example: B 2 NSA, signiﬁes that













































Structure of the hash table Tab Hn of the node n.
Hash of public key @IP
HðKPubA Þ A
HðKPubBÞ B
. . . . . .
Table 1




. . . . . .
Fig. 5. Structure of OLSR packet provided by node B and including its proof of
neighborhood with the node A.
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Q1and A trusts ðBÞ signiﬁes that A trusts the node which has the prov-
able identity IdPB ¼ HðKPubB Þ.
After packet reception, each node detects the identity of the
sender. For example, node B detects the identity of its neighbor A






1090If PA is valid )
TabIPBð@IPAÞ ¼ KPubA
TabHBðHðKPubAÞÞ ¼ @IPA; IdPA ¼ HðKPubA Þ
To prove to its neighbors (including A) that it is the symmetric
neighbor of A, we propose for B to send a message ProofBincluding






























1122ProofB  ProofB [ fHELLOA þ signHelloA þ KPubAg:
Thus, any neighbor of B (including A) will verify that A is effec-
tively neighbor of B and will declare A as 2-hop neighbor. Besides, A
can verify its own link with B and any links of B with its other
neighbors. If A ﬁnds that B has the proof of the reception of its HEL-
LO message HELLOA, it will establish a symmetric link with B and
advertise it.
After establishing a new symmetrical link, the proof is sent only
once,1 to prove the validity of the new symmetrical link to other
neighbors and to prove the validity of the other symmetrical links
to the new neighbor.
After receiving ProofB from B (the structure of the packet is pre-
sented in Fig. 5), all the symmetric neighbors of B will proceed to
the following veriﬁcation (8z 2 NSB):
 Check the integrity of the message ProofB: node zmust ﬁrst ver-
ify the integrity of each message. For example, for the HELLOA
message, it checks the consistency of the hash with the message
signature signHelloA using KPubA . If the message is validated then
z goes to the next step. Otherwise, the message is rejected and it
is impossible to prove that B is really neighbor of A, then node A
will not be considered as 2-hop neighbor.
 Veriﬁcation of symmetrical link: node z checks the symmetrical
link to ensure that node A also has declared B as symmetrical
neighbor:
1. If B is declared as symmetrical neighbor in the HELLO mes-
sage of A (HELLOA 2 ProofB and (B 2 NSA or B 2 MPRSA)),
then the link between A and B is validated, and node A is
inserted in the 2-hop neighbor set of z.
2. Otherwise, there is an inconsistency and the link is not
validated, and node B is reported as malicious node,
establishing the following relationship of mistrust:1 The message ProofB is sent only by node B, and must not be broadcasted. This
message will not be distributed throughout the network.
Please cite this article in press as: A. Adnane et al., Trust-based security for the O
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With this mechanism, the reception of the HELLO message is not
sufﬁcient to detect the 2-hop neighbors. For any link between sym-
metrical nodes x and y, each node z neighbor of xmust receive a va-
lid proof Proofx including HELLOy and claiming x also as symmetrical
neighbor. Only nodes that we have the proof of neighborhood are
inserted, in order to obtain 2-hop trusted neighborhood. Conse-
quently, attacks against the 2-hop neighborhood become inefﬁcient
because a node cannot lie about its neighbors (nodes in the trusted
neighborhood). This preventive mechanism will cover the rules of




The ﬁrst countermeasure concerns basic operations in OLSR
(neighborhood discovery and MPR selection) while the second
countermeasure concerns the distribution of information about
trust relations and attack detection to alert the other nodes.
In both solutions, we suppose that the time-stamp mechanism
proposed by SOLSR [20] and the provable identity mechanism pre-
sented previously are set up respectively to ensure the freshness
and authentication of messages.
In OLSR, when a node detects a symmetric neighbor, it consid-
ers the information provided as correct and establishes a trust rela-
tion. Using trust-based reasoning, when a symmetrical neighbor is
detected as malicious and does not respect the OLSR speciﬁcation,
the trust relation presented in formula (1) is broken. As a counter-
measure, we propose to reject messages of this neighbor and break
its symmetrical link. Thus, it will be isolated and the information it
sends will be ignored:
x:trustsðyÞ ) MNx ¼ MNx [ fyg; reject HELLOy and TCy ð15Þ
Where MNx (Mistrusted Nodes) is the set of malicious nodes
detected by x. When an inconsistency is detected, the provable
identity of the attacker node is inserted in this set. Thus, even if
the attacker node IP address changes, it will always be isolated. This
countermeasure is taken only when the detection is exact, and it
may be permanent or temporary depending on the user needs
and the context of use. Temporary countermeasures isolate the mis-
trusted node for a certain period of time, and allow the mistrusted
node to gain the trust of the network if he behaves correctly. When
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Q1to detect general misbehavior related to group of nodes, no counter-
measures is taken until exact mistrust is reached).
When an MPR node is detected as malicious, the ﬁrst counter-
measure to take is the same countermeasure as that taken when
a symmetric neighbor is malicious (15) in order to break the sym-
metric link. Secondly, it must update its MPR selection (to delete
the malicious node from the MPR set). It is important to point
out that there are certain cases where the malicious neighbor is
the only MPR to provide access to certain nodes of the network,
and breaking symmetrical link with this neighbor means that the
node cannot access the network accessible through the malicious
neighbor.
The second countermeasure we propose is to share information
about detected attacks by broadcasting an alert to notify all nodes
in the network to mistrust the attacker. However, to avoid false
alerts, the alert must provide reliable proofs of the attack that can-
not be falsiﬁed. When the detection is exact, we propose to broad-
cast messages that have revealed inconsistencies and allow
detection of the attack. Moreover, provable identity and messages
signing (SOLSR) ensure the authenticity and integrity of each
message and ensure the reliability and integrity of alerts. It is
important to note that the alert is not a new type of message,
but that it represents the broadcast of control messages which re-
vealed an inconsistency.
Trust reasoning, for inconsistency detection, is based on the
comparison of provided information (HELLO; TC and DATA mes-
sages) with local vision. Therefore, the alert consists in broadcast-
ing the two messages that have revealed the inconsistency
(including HELLOmessages) and allow the attack detection accord-
ing to the two following scenarios:
1. When a node detects inconsistency between received message
and local vision, it must notify the other nodes by forwarding
the received message, and the message representing its local
vision (HELLO or TC). For example, if a node detects inconsis-
tency between its MPR selection and the received message, then
it must forward the received message and its HELLO message,
because the HELLO message represents the MPR selection. Also,
if the inconsistency concerns MPR selectors, then it must
retransmit its TC message instead of the HELLO message.
2. When a node detects inconsistency between two messages
provided by other nodes, it has to alert the network by retrans-
mitting these two messages. For example: if a node detects that
its neighbor x advertises certain nodes in its TC message, but
does not advertise them in its HELLO message, then it detects
inconsistency between the HELLO and TC messages of x, and
has to broadcast these messages.
It is important to note that the ﬁrst countermeasure (as deﬁned
in the previous section) must be set up before sending alert
messages. Precisely when the attacker is MPR, we must break the
symmetrical link and update the MPR selection to ensure that
the alert reaches all the nodes of the network. On the other hand,
even if the TC messages are expected to reach all nodes of the
network, when the attacker is MPR, it can disrupt routing, and
therefore there is no guarantee that these messages reach all
nodes. So when the alert includes TC messages and concerns
MPR node, it is important to retransmit these messages after the
detection of the attack and the change in the MPR selection.
Each node receiving the alert will apply the same reasoning (de-
tect a malicious node). It will compare the information provided in
the alert with the local vision before the broadcast. Furthermore,
before broadcasting alerts, the provided information must be cor-
related with the local vision to detect false alerts and refuse to
broadcast alerts generated by malicious nodes. For example if y
has already detected x as malicious node, then it should not broad-Please cite this article in press as: A. Adnane et al., Trust-based security for the O
j.comcom.2013.04.003cast the alert generated by x. Note that the distribution of a trust
proof allows nodes that have not detected the attack to detect it,
and also allows exact detection for nodes that have established a
partial detection of the attack.
These countermeasures imply the retransmission of HELLO
messages when an alert is broadcasted, and consequently, on
receiving these messages an asymmetric link is created with the
HELLO message source. This indirect consequence does not affect
the routing operations, since asymmetric links are not considered
for the MPR selection and the routing table calculation, and are de-
leted after a certain time if the symmetrical link is not created.
Furthermore, these countermeasures involve the back up of re-
ceived messages during a speciﬁc period in order to compare them
with messages received thereafter. The backup process is applied
to each received message, and only saves the important informa-
tion (e.g. the message type (HELLO; TC or DATA), the message
freshness (according to the time-stamp in SOLSR), the sequence
number, the source address, and the list of nodes declared in the
message and the type of link for HELLO messages). If the message
is already stored with the same sequence number or an inferior
number, then its contents and validity time are updated. If the
message is received for the ﬁrst time then it is stored with a
validity time. When the validity time has expired the message is
deleted.8. Simulation results of trust-based reasoning
We have used the GlomoSim Simulator and the OLSR patch
developed by the Niigata University to simulate the attacks and
previous formulas. We have added to this patch a module imple-
menting trust rules, and several attack scenarios. In our simula-
tions, ad hoc networks are composed of 50 nodes which are
placed randomly. Moreover, the attackers are selected randomly,
and each one selects an attack scenario, as well as a set of targets
according the selected attack. However, since the ad hoc networks
have to be stabilized to allow the attacker to perform the attacks,
we have considered that nodes are not mobile. The following at-
tacks was implemented: generation and modiﬁcation of HELLO
messages, generation and modiﬁcation of TC messages, black-hole
attack and identity spooﬁng attack (see Table 3).
In the following, we discuss only results with 50 nodes using
the ﬁrst attack scenario which takes place according to the follow-
ing steps:
1. The attacker A identiﬁes target T, its neighbors and 2 hop
neighbors.
2. The attacker A detects its common neighbors with the target T,
and modiﬁes its HELLOmessages to advertise their neighbors as
symmetric neighbors as well as an additional ﬁctitious node X.
3. The attacker advertises the target’s 2 hop neighbors in its TC
messages.
According to OLSR speciﬁcation, the target has to select the at-
tacker as MPR because it provides reachability for the node X, and
so the attacker can control some target’s ﬂows.
Simulation results are presented in the ﬁgures Table 3A–C. In
the case of one attacker and one target (Table 3A), the detection
rate is usually 100%. However, there is one case where the detec-
tion rate was 0%, this is the case where the target is completely iso-
lated from other network nodes and/or when the attacker is always
a unique MPR of the target (even before applying the attack). It is
obvious that in this situation the objective of such an attack makes
no sense because the attacker is already MPR unique of the target
and can therefore control all its messages. The realization of the at-
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Q1detected. The only point on which the attacker has lied, is its link
with the ﬁctitious node (which has no relevance in this situation).
This lie can not be detected because a node can be the unique MPR
node of other nodes. Thus, a malicious node can create as many ﬁc-
tional neighbors it wants, since it will be their only symmetric
neighbor, and the other nodes of the network have no way to verify
the physical existence of the latter.
This attack represents a passive listening, because it allows the
attacker to analyze messages ﬂow of the target, and it will be de-
tected when the attacker is active. For example, by refusing to
retransmit packets.
In the case of multiple targets (Table 3B) and attackers (Table
3C), the results of detections relate the attack against each target
separately. attackers are completely independent. It is important
to note that in some simulations the detection rate is lower than
100% for several reasons:
 In some scenarios, the simulation time is not enough for all
nodes to establish a global vision of the network, and so they
are not able to detect the attack.
 The simulator chooses the attacker randomly. Thus, the estab-
lishment of the attack may fail if the attacker has no neighbor,
or if the attacker is the unique MPR of the target.
Moreover, some nodes are unable to precisely detect the attack-
er (partial detection). This situation can be resolved by a system ofPlease cite this article in press as: A. Adnane et al., Trust-based security for the O
j.comcom.2013.04.003distribution of trust proof (countermeasures, Section 7). Thus,
nodes that detect the attack exactly distribute the attack proof
and enable other nodes to also detect the malicious nodes.
9. Conclusion
We have presented a trust-based solution for securing the OLSR
Ad hoc routing protocol in three steps. The ﬁrst step was the anal-
ysis of the implicit trust relations in OLSR. This analysis highlights
the possible measures to make OLSR more reliable by exploiting
the operations and information already existing in the protocol.
To detect misbehaving nodes, we have developed in the second
step, trust-based reasoning by correlating information provided in
the OLSR messages received from the network. The integration of
this reasoning allows each node to check the consistency of the
behavior of other nodes and validate trust relationships estab-
lished implicitly.
Finally, the third step complements the second by offering two
complementary solutions: prevention to resolve certain vulnera-
bilities of OLSR protocol, and countermeasures to stop and isolate
malicious nodes. These proposals correspond to the trust reasoning
that has been done by each node. Simulation results illustrate the
effectiveness of trust-based reasoning and countermeasures to
stop and isolate misbehaving nodes.
In summary, we demonstrated that our solution allows to verify
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Q1speciﬁcation of OLSR. This result allowed us to ensure efﬁcient
routing operations and ensure the validity of the network topology
(routing table). Our approach brings few modiﬁcations on OLSR
packets, and it is still compatible with the bare OLSR and SOLSR.
These results motivate extending the approach for establishing
more example of simulation and to check degree of automation of
reasoning about trust in order to measure the impact of these solu-
tions on Qos of the protocol, while preserving the self-organization
and the dynamic environment of ad hoc network. Moreover, our
approach can be applied more generally to other protocols in
spontaneous and self-organized environment. The explicit speciﬁ-
cation of trust relations leads to identify whether the underlying
assumptions for the operation of a protocol are realistic or not.
Moreover, explicit trust-relations can be used in formal analysis
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